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A commentary on
Creativity and Memory: Effects of an Episodic-Specificity Induction on Divergent Thinking
by Madore, K. P., Addis, D. R., and Schacter, D. L. (2015). Psychol. Sci. 26, 1461–1468. doi:
10.1177/0956797615591863
Madore et al. (2015) reported evidence in support of the idea that episodic-specificity induction
facilitates creative thinking. In this Commentary, I draw attention to the issue of clarity in the
targeting of creativity-relevant operations. The basis of these concerns is grounded in the atypical
nature of the adopted methodological protocols as well as the terminology used to refer to the
measures of interest. Such inconsistencies could lead to confusion or the perpetuation of misguided
notions. The objective of this commentary is to therefore lay bare these concerns so that future
investigations based on this study will be mindful of the same.
The information processing mechanisms underlying creativity have for long been discussed
in relation to operations of declarative memory such that individual differences in creativity
are held to emerge from variability in the manner in which stored concepts are either
accessed from or associated with one another within long-term semantic memory networks
(Mednick, 1962; Mendelsohn, 1974). Although, explicit formulations on how the processes
that underlie creative thought tie together with other aspects of imagination are fairly recent
(Abraham and Bubic, 2015; Beaty et al., 2016), the idea that free-associative episodic thinking
is intertwined with creative operations was, in fact, highlighted in one of the first neuroimaging
studies of episodic memory (Andreasen et al., 1995). The novel finding of the selective
impact of inducing episodic retrieval strategies on idea generation therefore represents a
timely development (Madore et al., 2015). What needs to be clarified is which aspects of
creativity are influenced by episodic-specific induction as this is not readily apparent from the
paper.
The main concern stems from the unorthodox scoring protocol adopted by Madore et al.
(2015) for the Alternate Uses Task (AUT), where participants generate as many uses as possible for
common objects. Four measures are typically derived from the AUT: fluency (number of discrete
uses), originality (degree of unusualness of the uses), flexibility (number of discrete categories
of uses), and elaboration (the degree of detail associated with the uses). Which of these are
assessed depends on the aims of the study in question and the version of the AUT being adopted
(Guilford et al., 1960; Wallach and Kogan, 1965). In the manifold studies that have used the
AUT, appropriateness is an inclusion criterion for determining a use to be valid. In fact, the
AUT manual clearly states, “A use, to be acceptable, should be possible for the object” (Guilford
et al., 1960, p. 30). So an inappropriate use is not evaluated further when deriving the AUT
measures.
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This is where the Madore et al. (2015) protocol departs sharply
from the standard as they evaluate all uses when determining
somemeasures. In line with another study that has used a similar,
but not identical, protocol (Addis et al., 2016), uses deemed
appropriate received a score of 1 and inappropriate uses a score
of 0. The only AUT measures in relation to which they report
significant findings across both experiments as a function of
induction type (as reflected by significant interaction effects:
induction × task) were termed “categories of appropriateness”
(in the main article) and “appropriateness” (in the Supplemental
Material).
The potential for considerable confusion enters here
because the “categories of appropriateness” measure reflects the
number of categories of appropriate uses, which corresponds
to the standard AUT “flexibility” measure. The same is
true of “appropriateness,” which reflects the number of
acceptable uses, as this corresponds to the standard AUT
“fluency” measure. The authors adopt a different notion of
flexibility and fluency as also incorporating inappropriate uses
(Supplemental Material). No grounds have been forwarded to
explain the necessity for such differences from the standard
protocol1 nor have they been explicitly acknowledged in the
paper.
It is worth noting that the authors also assessed the
degree of overall creativity associated with the generated
uses. Here again, the AUT “originality” measure was not
referred to but a similar “creativity” measure2 was derived
following another scoring protocol (Benedek et al., 2014) which
reflects “how original and unusual each use was.” Across both
experiments, episodic-specificity induction was not found to have
1Similar inconsistencies also apply to the control object association task, where
participants are given an object cue and listed other objects that are typically
associated with it. However, the study cited as the source for this task (Abraham
et al., 2012) employed the object location task, where participants received a
location cue and were required to recall objects that would be typically found in
that location. These differences are not inconsequential as associative and scene
construction processes would be differentially engaged by both tasks.
2 The authors stated that this measure and the elaboration measure was focused on
in relation to the “categories of appropriate uses” measure, but what this means is
unclear.
a significant impact on this measure, nor on the elaboration
measure.
So the takeaway message in terms of divergent thinking is
that episodic-specificity induction has a significant impact on
fluency and flexibility, but does not have a significant impact on
originality and elaboration.
Using standard and clear terminology serves as a great aid
in being able to relate exciting novel findings to the published
literature. For instance, episodic based strategies are dominantly
used in the early phase of idea generation and are associated
with the generation of already known—and therefore personally
unoriginal—uses (Gilhooly et al., 2007). Episodic-specificity
induction is linked to an increase in the number of generated
details in memory and imagination (Madore and Schacter, 2016),
but only the AUT elaboration score is positively correlated with
the level of internal detail given during episodic simulation of
both past and future events (Addis et al., 2016). It would be useful
to explore how different components of episodic cognition tie in
with select facets of creativity.
It is crucial that a topic as vital as the study of creativity
rapidly become less of a niche domain in cognitive psychology
and neuroscience, and that more researchers the world over
invest their expertise, energy, and indeed creativity to explore
this singularly rich and central facet of human life. The Madore
et al. (2015) paper provides the right kind of impetus for this to
happen. It is essential though that clarity and specificity at the
level of definition be maintained as this will serve to facilitate the
extent to which findings based on episodic memory approaches
will be accurately embedded within the larger literature on
creativity.
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